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I. INTRODUCTION
"It's a catharsis for me to curse and to be angry and to break up the
place. All I did was break some [expletive deleted]. I broke... I just
broke things. I turned the table over. I did this; I did that."'
All states make it a crime to damage the property of another person
without his or her consent.2 The laws that criminalize the destruction of
*Victoria L. Lutz is Director of the Pace University Battered Women's Justice Center. Cam
M. Bonomolo is a third-year law student and research assistant at the Center.
1. Recorded conversation, between a wife and her husband who broke over $600 worth of
household property (Nov. 1995) (on file with author). The prosecutor refused to charge him with
criminal mischief even though the police had seen broken property and the husband later made
this admissible confession. See infra Introduction, case study of Mr. X.
2. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-21 (1994); ALAsKA STAT. § 11.46.480 (Michie 1996); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-38-203 (Michie 1993
& Supp. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 594 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-4-501 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-115 (West 1994); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 811 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.13 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-7-22 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-821 (1993 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-7001 (1987); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-43-1-2 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.1 (West 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3720 (1995 & Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 512.020 (Michie 1990);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:56 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 806 (West Supp.
1996); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957 § 111 (1996); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 127 (West
1990 & Supp. 1996); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.377a (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.595 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-67 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 569.100 (West 1979 & Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-101 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-519 (1995); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 206.310 (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 634:2 (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-3 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-15-1 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00-145.12 (McKinney 1988); N.C.
1
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property are most commonly labeled criminal mischief;3 however, in some
states the crime is called criminal damage,4 vandalism,5 malicious injury,6
malicious mischief,7 intentional damage,8 property destruction and deface-
ment,9 or unlawful mischief." The purpose of these statutes is to create and
assign penal law sanctions and responsibility for the reckless, knowing, or
intentional damaging of another's property without a legal right to do so.II
Despite the ubiquity of criminal mischief'2 statutes, in a majority of
jurisdictions, criminal mischief law is not routinely applied in domestic
violence situations. That is, prosecutors do not commonly charge individuals
for destroying the property of a spouse or partner or property that they jointly
owned. 13 This is so even though "[b]atterers often damage property to
terrorize, threaten, and exert control over a victim of domestic violence." 4
GEN. STAT. § 14-160 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-05 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2909.05 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1760 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); OR.
REV. STAT. § 164.365 (Supp. pt. 3 1996); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-44-1 (1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-510
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-34-1 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1996); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-14-408 (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03 (\Vest 1994 & Supp. 1997);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-106 (Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3701 (1974); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-137 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.080 (West Supp. 1997); W.
VA. CODE § 61-3-30 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.01 (West 1996); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-
201 (Michie 1988).
3. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-21; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-501; IND. CODEANN.
§ 35-43-1-2; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 806; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.05; 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3304; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-106.
4. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1602.
5. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 594.
6. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-510.
7. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-67.
8. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-34-1.
9. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-201.
10. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3701.
11. 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal Mischief § 2 (1987).
12. Unless otherwise noted in the text, this article will use "criminal mischief" as a generic
term for property damage crimes enumerated in footnotes 2-11.
13. Throughout this article, the defendants in domestic violence cases will be referred to as
male.
Of all adult domestic violence cases reported to the National Crime Victimization
Survey (NCVS) from 1987-91, 93% were victimizations of women by their male
partners. Also, compared to males, females experienced over 10 times as many
incidents of violence by an intimate. On average each year, women experienced
over 572,000 violent victimizations committed by an intimate, compared to
approximately 49,000 incidents committed against men.
NEW YORK STATE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DATA SHEET (1996)
(citing U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTICE, VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES (1994)).
14. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye G. Orloff, ProvidingLegal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFsTRA L. REV. 801, 873 (1993).
[Vol. 48:641
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/6
1997] CRIMINAL MISCHIEF STATUTES IN DOMESTIC SETTINGS 643
Documented examples of property damage inflicted by batterers have included:
pulling telephone cords from walls, destroying furniture, breaking a window
and skylights, chopping holes in a roof with an axe, driving a truck through
a garage wall, damaging the spouse's car, injuring or killing a family pet,
damaging the spouse's clothing, and breaking other items of sentimental value
to the spouse. 5 Although in most states a batterer can destroy property in the
marital residence without criminal consequence,16 some states have held
defendants criminally liable under similar statutes for damaging community or
marital property.
17
To illustrate the nature of the subject abuse and the context in which
criminal mischief could be used as a weapon against domestic violence, the
following actual case is offered as a backdrop for the discussion that follows.
On November 2, 1995, Mr. X broke many items in the marital resi-
dence-including a dining room chair, a cookie jar, other bric-a-brac, and a
five hundred dollar table that Mrs. X had won two months earlier at a church
benefit. Interestingly, Mr. X did not break any of his dental equipment, his
model airplanes, or other items of his own personal property. The unusual
table clearly belonged to his wife and, thus, became the object of his anger.
(Mr. X later admitted on tape that when he gets angry he breaks things.) The
District Attorney's Office refused to charge criminal mischief as a felony (or
misdemeanor). Mrs. Xpondered, "If he's not charged with criminal mischief,
what will prevent him from trashing every item in our home?" This article will
analyze the construction of criminal mischief statutes around the country and
discuss how they can be and have been used in domestic violence situations
such as the one just described.
II. THE MINIMAL HISTORY OF CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
The offense known today as criminal mischief developed historically as
"malicious mischief."1 To a large extent, however, history has successfully
shrouded the exact origin of malicious mischief. Common law characterized
malicious mischief as a trespass, so some courts labeled it as a "mere civil
wrong."19 Yet, other writers have described malicious mischief as a misde-
15. Id. at 873-74.
16. In New York, for example, often the batterer who has broken a window in the home or
otherwise destroyed furniture or household goods in the course of a violent domestic incident will
not be charged with criminal mischief. He may be charged with a "violation" called
"harassment." See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1989). Such a non-criminal nomencla-
ture belittles the damage that has been perpetrated and fails to adequately describe the nature of
the wrongdoing.
17. See discussion infra Section IV.
18. CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 485 (14th ed. 1981).
19. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Mischief § 1 (1970).
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meanor at common law.' The offense, nonetheless, did become the subject of
legislation at an earlier time in both England and the United States.2 ' In fact,
the earliest English statute on this subject, Westminster I, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 46,
may have been enacted in 1285.1 In The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on
the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present,23 Martin R. Gardner
writes that the origins of malicious mischief legislation spring from the Black
Act of 1722, which required "the death penalty, without benefit of clergy, for
anyone 'unlawfully and maliciously' killing, wounding, or maiming cattle."
As criminal mischief statutes developed, they consisted of numerous
specifically prohibited types of harm to particular types of property.' The
Model Penal Code consolidated all forms of criminal mischief into a single
generic offense, and many states followed its example, concentrating former
malicious mischief provisions into a single comprehensive offense or an
integrated series of related offenses.'
I. THE AiMERIcAN STATUTES
Today, criminal mischief offenses are characterized as either misde-
meanors or felonies. Exactly which characterization will prevail depends on
the jurisdiction, the value of the property destroyed, and the mental state of
the actor. The basic elements of criminal mischief statutes are the same in all
states: (1) destruction of property (2) belonging to another (3) of a particular
minimum value plus (4) some level of a culpable mental state. 27 The mens rea
required by each statute, however, frequently differs. Most statutes require a
simple intent to damage property." Other statutes sanction damage to property
20. Id.; TORCIA, supra note 18, § 485.
21. TORCIA, supra note 18, § 485.
22. Id.
23. Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 635.
24. Id. at 713 (referring to ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BoYcE, CRIMINAL LAW 410
(3d ed. 1982)).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 cmt. 1 at 41 (1980). "In New York, for example there
were more than 200 such statutes." Id. at 41 n.1.
26. Id. § 220.3 cmt. 1 at 42.
27. One of several New York criminal mischief statutes, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.05
(McKinney 1988), is illustrative of criminal mischief statutes around the country:
A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the third degree when, with intent to
damage property of another person, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable
ground to believe that he has such right, he damages property of another person in
an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.
28. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-21 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.480 (Michie 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-115 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 811 (1995); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-7-22 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-821 (1994 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE
[Vol. 48:641
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when it is done recklessly,29 purposely,3" maliciously,
31 knowingly,32 wifully, 33
wantonly,34 mischievously,31 or unlawfully. 36 Only Pennsylvania makes it a
crime to damage property by negligence.37 Further, some criminal mischief
statutes sanction destruction done with any of a variety of culpable mental
states.3 8 For example, in Indiana, the criminal mischief statute makes it a
ANN. § 35-43-1-2 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); IOwA CODE ANN. § 716.1 (West 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3720 (1995 & Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 512.020 (Michie 1990);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:56 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 806 (West Supp.
1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.595 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-519
(1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-15-1 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00-145.12
(McKinney 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.365 (1990 & Supp. 1996); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3304 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-34-1 (Michie 1988 & Supp.
1996); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
106 (Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3701 (1974); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 943.01 (West
1996).
29. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 811; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-2; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 806; NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-519; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:2 (Supp. 1996); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3304.
30. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-101 (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 634:2; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-3 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
31. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 594 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 806.13 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 18-7001 (1987); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957
§ 111 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 127 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-17-67 (1994); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 206.310 (Michie 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1760 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-44-1 (1994 & Supp. 1995);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-510 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.080
(West Supp. 1997).
32. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-501 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-2; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 806; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.100 (West 1979 & Supp. 1997); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-6-101; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-3 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2909.05 (Anderson 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-408 (1991); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 28.03; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.080; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-201
(Michie 1988).
33. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.13; MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957 § 111; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 127; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.377a (West 1991); NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 206.310; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-160 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-05
(1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-44-1; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-510.
34. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 512.020 (Michie 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-160.
35. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-67; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-44-1.
36. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-137 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-30 (1992).
37. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996) (limiting such negligence
to "the employment of fire, explosives, or other dangerous means").
38. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 811 (1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-2 (West
1994 & Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 512.020; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 806
(West Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-67; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-101 (1995); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-519 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 206.310; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
5
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crime to "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damage... or deface...
[the] property of another person without the other person's consent."3 9 Other
statutes seem to require a combination of mental states.4 ° In particular, the
statute in South Carolina makes it a crime to "wilfully and maliciously...
injure or destroy any . . . kind, class, article, or description of personal
property, or the goods and chattels of another."4" Finally, in some states,
New York for example, the level of the offense depends partially on the
culpable mental state of the actor.4' If the actor damages property recklessly,
the crime may be no more than a misdemeanor.43 On the other hand, if the
actor damages property intentionally, the crime can be a misdemeanor or a
felony, depending upon the value of the property.'
In states where criminal mischief statutes require proof of intentional or
purposeful damage to property, the defendant must have acted with a conscious
object or purpose to engage in conduct of a particularized and destructive
nature or to cause a particular destructive result.4' This particularized intent
requirement restricts a court's inquiry to the actor's mental disregard for
property' 6 and would seem to foreclose convicting an offender whose only
purpose was to injure a person.47 For example, in People v. Roberts,'" a New
York court reversed the defendant's conviction for criminal mischief after
finding that the defendant damaged a coffee table when he threw his wife upon
it. The court concluded that, since the evidence revealed only an intent
directed toward the victim's person, the People had failed to prove that the
defendant specifically intended to damage the coffee table.49 By analogy,
statutes that require destructive acts to be done intentionally or purposely
§ 634:2 (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-3 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3304; TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
39. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-2.
40. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.13 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); MD. ANN. CODE OF
1957 § 111 (1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.377a (West 1991); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-17-67; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-160 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-510 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.080 (West Supp. 1997).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-510 (emphasis added).
42. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00-145.12 (McKinney 1988).
43. Id. at § 145.00.
44. Id. at §§ 145.00-145.12.
45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-2-2(1) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202 (Michie 1993);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 501.020 (Michie 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2 (West 1995); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (West 1994).
46. See, e.g., People v. Culp, 310 N.W.2d 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Summer,
407 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1978); State v. Patch, 488 A.2d 755 (Vt. 1985).
47. 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal Mischief § 4 (1987) (citing In re Daniel K., 453
N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1982)); People v. Roberts, 529 N.Y.S.2d 636 (App. Div. 1988).
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would excuse a defendant who threw a paperweight at his wife but missed and
smashed the television set instead. Such a defendant would not be guilty of
criminal mischief because the mens rea of intending to damage property would
be lacking.
In states where a person may be guilty of criminal mischief for recklessly
damaging the property of another, the results seem more equitable. ° In such
jurisdictions, a husband may be charged with criminal mischief if, in his
anger, he throws a chair around the room, smashing any objects in the chair's
path. Although the husband may not have specifically intended to destroy the
valuable antique vase bequeathed to his wife, he is acting with conscious
disregard of the fact that throwing the chair around the room will result in the
damage of property; it does not matter that his anger is directed primarily at
a person rather than a thing.
The mens rea of knowledge is used in two contexts in criminal mischief
statutes. The first describes the kind of mind-set that the defendant must have
when he is damaging the property; he must knowingly destroy it. The second
describes the mind-set the defendant must have regarding the ownership of the
property that he is destroying; he must know that the property belongs to
another. Many states require proof of the former knowledge element.51 Nine
states require some proof of both.52 Finally, under criminal mischief statutes
that require distinctive acts to be done knowingly, the knowledge that property
belongs to another also generally includes the awareness of a substantial
probability that this fact exists. 3
50. A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a risk that an element exists or
will result from the conduct, and such disregard involves a gross deviation from the conduct that
a reasonable person would observe in the same situation. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-105(9)(c) (West Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 35 (West 1983); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-109(19) (1995).
51. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
52. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-21 (1994); ALAsKA STAT. § 11.46.480 (Michie 1996); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-115 (West 1994); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 512.020 (Michie 1990); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 806 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:2 (Supp.
1996); N.Y. PENALLAW §§ 145.00-145.12 (McKinney 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.365 (Supp.
pt. 3 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3701 (1974).
53. 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal Mischief § 4 (1987). In People v. Jones, 495 N.E.2d
1371 (11. App. Ct. 1986), however, the court held that a defendant was guilty of criminal
damage to property when he "knowingly" damaged an automobile belonging in part to his
estranged wife. The court so held even though the defendant may not have "known" that the
automobile was the "property of another" for purposes of the statute. The court found that
"[liegislative intent and the construction of the statute dictate that 'knowingly' modifies the next
word, 'damages,' but not 'property of another.'" Id. at 1373 (agreeing with the reasoning of
People v. Ivy, 479 N.E.2d 399 (Il. App. Ct. 1985)). Because the defendant admitted that he
intentionally damaged the car, "the State [had] met its burden of proving the requisite element
of knowledge." Id.
7
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In some states, malice is an essential element of criminal mischief.
"Malice" generally is proven by showing the defendant committed an offense
with "either of two mental states: (1) intent to commit the social harm; or
(2) recklessness in committing the social harm."54 Many criminal mischief
statutes that require acting maliciously also require acting willfully5 or
knowingly. 6 According to some courts, the malice necessary to constitute the
offense of criminal mischief must be directed toward the owner of the
damaged or destroyed property." Yet, other courts view malice in the
traditional legal sense, malice at law, which merely denotes the state of mind
leading to the intentional or reckless destruction of property without justifica-
tion or excuse.58 State statutes that define malice often combine both views
by defining malice as "a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an
intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of
law."59 Ironically, when a batterer damages the property of his wife, he does
so to terrorize, threaten, and exert control over her.' As a result, his actions
satisfy the requirements that he act with a "wish to vex, annoy, or injure
another person" and that he intends to do a wrongful act. Therefore,
irrespective of how "malice" is defined, a batterer may be guilty of criminal
mischief for damaging the property of his wife.
In addition to the mens rea discussed above, New York and eight other
states also require that the defendant damage the property "having no right to
do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right. "61 If a
statute contains this additional element, a defendant does not violate the
statute, provided that he has a reasonable ground to believe that he had the
right to destroy property, even if he, in fact, had no right to do so.62
However, the defendant who merely relies on an unreasonable belief that he
54. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.04[D] (1987).
55. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.13 (Vest 1992 & Supp. 1997); MD. ANN. CODE OF
1957 § 111 (1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.377a (West 1991).
56. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.080 (West Supp. 1997).
57. TORCIA, supra note 18, § 486 n.26; 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Mischief § 8 & n.3
(1970).
58. TORCIA, supra note 18, § 486 nn.28-30; 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Mischief § 8 (1970).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(4) (West 1988); see also IDAHO CODE § 18-101(4) (1987); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.0175 (Michie 1992).
60. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 14, at 873.
61. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.05 (McKinney 1988) (emphasis added); see also ALA. CODE
§ 13A-7-21 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.480 (Michie 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
115 (West 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 512.020 (Michie 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 806 (West Supp. 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:2 (Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 164.365 (Supp. pt. 3 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3701 (1974).
62. Conversely, where a statute does not contain this additional element, the defendant is
guilty of criminal mischief for destroying the property of another, having no legal right to do so,
even if he had a reasonable ground to believe that he had a right to destroy that property.
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could destroy the property of another is guilty. Statutes that contain this
additional language may pose a problem in domestic violence situations
because the husband who destroys the television in the home he shares with
his wife may believe that he has a right to do so. In such situations, the
defendant will always have a potentially viable mistake of fact defense. He
need simply state that he thought that he could destroy the property since he
also owned it.63 The difficulty with the wording of the statute is that it places
on the People the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not have a reasonable belief that he could destroy the property
in question. The positive flip-side is that jurors can dismiss a defendant's
protestations of lack of intent if they find his excuses to be unreasonable.
Under many of the circumstances in which vandalism of community property
takes place, as in the previously discussed case of Mr. and Mrs. X, the facts
of the case can establish that the defendant's choice of destructive actions
speak louder than his words of explanation.
Although many statutes refer to the destruction of property,' other
statutes broaden the offense to include damaging, ' defacing, ' injuring, 67
altering,68 mutilating,69 disfiguring,70 or causing physical harm71 to prop-
erty. In most states, the level of the offense or the severity of the punishment
is at least partially determined by the monetary amount of damage inflicted or
by the value of the property destroyed.'
63. A mistake of fact defense works in two ways: it may negate an actor's moral culpability
for causing the social harm, and it may negate an express element of the offense. The defendant
has the initial burden to produce evidence that he or she was mistaken. However, the prosecution
has the burden of persuading the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
possessed the requisite mens rea of the offense. DRESSLER, supra note 54, § 12.02 & n.7.
64. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 594 (West Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 18-7001; IOWA
CODE ANN. § 716.1 (West 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-510 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996).
65. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-21; ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1602 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 594; IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.1.
66. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); IOwA CODE
ANN. § 716.1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-106 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
67. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.13 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); Miss CODE ANN.
§ 97-17-67 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-510.
68. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.1.
69. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3720 (1995).
70. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-67.
71. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2909.05 (Anderson 1996).
72. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Mischief § 3 (1970); 54 C.J.S Malicious or CriminalMischief
§ 5 (1987).
9
Bonomolo and Lutz: My Husband Just Trashed Our Home: What Do You Mean That's Not a C
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
IV. WHAT IS "PROPERTY OF ANOTHER?"
Property is deemed to be that of another person if anyone, other than the
defendant, has a possessory or proprietary interest in the tangible property.73
So, "[wihere two people have an ownership interest in the same property,
[criminal mischief] statutes may prohibit one person from damaging the other's
interest."'" Therefore, an item's status as marital property owned jointly by
husband and wife would not preclude its destruction from being a violation of
a criminal mischief statute.
"[Iln the modem common-law property system, property may belong
either to the husband, to the wife or to both." 7' Property that belongs to
either the husband or the wife is "separate property,"7" while property that
belongs to both the husband and the wife is "community" or "marital
property."' "[S]tatutes define marital property as all property, however
titled, acquired by the parties during marriage."78 "Separate property... is
either property owned by a spouse before marriage or property acquired
during marriage by gift, bequest, devise or descent."'79
Clearly, a husband has no right to damage the separate property of his
wife because it is property in which he has no ownership interest and is,
therefore, deemed to be the "property of another." A strong argument, based
on a twenty-five-year-old Supreme Court case, can be made that a husband
also has no right to damage marital property owned by both of them. In
73. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-38-101(3) (Michie 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.14
practice commentary (McKinney 1988). The Model Penal Code defines "property of another"
as property "in which any person other than the actor has an interest which the actor is not
privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the proper-
ty .... " MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 cmt. 3 (1980). Several states, including Maine, New
Hampshire, and South Dakota, have adopted the Model Penal Code definition. Id. § 220.3 &
n.22. Others, such as North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah, define the phrase as "property in which
someone other than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest." Montana defines "the
phrase as property in which a person other than the offender has an interest which the offender
has no authority to defeat or impair, even though the offender himself may have an interest in
the property." Id. § 220.3 cmt. 3 & nn.24-25.
74. 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal Mischief § 3 (1987).
75. Emily Osborn, Comment, The Treatment of Unearned Separate Property at Divorce in
Common Law Property Ju~isdictions, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 903, 906.
76. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1530 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining "separate property"
as "[plroperty owned by married person in his or her own right during marriage").
77. Id. at 351 (defining "community property" as "[p]roperty owned in common by a
husband and wife as a kind of marital partnership"). Community property states use the term
"community property," whereas equitable distribution states use "marital property." Robin P.
Rosen, Note, A CriticalAnalysis of Celebrity Careers As Property Upon Dissolution ofMarriage,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522, 525 n.12 (1993).
78. Id. at 528 & n.27.
79. Osbom, supra note 75, at 909.
[Vol. 48:641
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Kirchberg v. Feenstra,80 the Court invalidated a Louisiana community
property statute that gave the husband, as the head and master, "the unilateral
right to dispose of property jointly owned" with his wife without spousal
consent. It follows that a husband does not have the right to damage property
jointly owned with his wife.
When a husband and wife own property together, they are often deemed
to have a joint tenancy in the property. "Joint tenancy is a tenancy of two or
more persons whose interests are equal in every respect."" Each concurrent-
ly owns all of the undivided whole and has a nonexclusive right to possess that
undivided whole." Thus, when a husband destroys property that he owns
jointly with his wife, not only does he destroy his property, which he may
have a right to destroy, but he simultaneously destroys his wife's undivided
one hundred percent interest in the property, which he does not have a right
to destroy. Therefore, when a husband destroys marital property, he destroys
the property of another and violates this element of criminal mischief statutes.
V. THE CASE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CONTEXT
Because criminal mischief statutes have not routinely been used in
domestic violence situations, most state courts have not answered the question
of whether property owned jointly by a husband and wife, or property in the
home that they share together, constitutes property of another. However,
Wharton's Criminal Law, 3 and many state statutes as well, defines property
of another as any property where "any person or government other than the
actor has a possessory or proprietary interest"' therein. Furthermore, cases
from appellate courts in California, Illinois, Iowa, and Washington demon-
strate that a husband does not have a right to destroy the property of his wife
just because he too may have an ownership interest in the property." These
uncontroverted appellate holdings support the conclusion that a husband can
and should be charged with criminal mischief for destroying community
property.
80. 450 U.S. 455, 455 (1981).
81. MELLINKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 212 (1992). Although the term
joint tenancy originated in a real property context, "it has expanded into every sort ofpersonalty,
including popular joint tenancy bank accounts." Id.
82. Id.
83. TORCIA, supra note 18, § 490.
84. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-38-101(3) (Michie 1993); see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:17-1(t) (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-08(2) (1985).
85. See infra notes 92, 95, 98, 109.
11
Bonomolo and Lutz: My Husband Just Trashed Our Home: What Do You Mean That's Not a C
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
As noted in People v. Kahanic,86 where a wife was convicted of
vandalizing the car that she and her husband owned:
The essence of the crime is in the physical acts against the ownership
interest of another, even though that ownership is less than exclusive....
Each community property owner has an equal ownership interest and,
although undivided, one which the criminal law protects from unilateral
nonconsensual damage or destruction by the other marital partner. 87
The court also noted, "Property is deemed to be that of another if 'any person
or government other than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest'
therein.""8 Based on this reasoning, it is logical to construe the language the
property of another in criminal mischief statutes to include property where
ownership is shared between husband and wife.
In People v. Schneider,89 an Illinois court analyzed the language of its
arson statute to determine the scope of the words property of another. The
court held that the "defendant could be convicted for damag[ing an] ...
automobile in [his] wife's possession, even though [the] defendant assertedly
had [a] partial ownership interest in the automobile."' The court noted that
the arson statute defined property of another as "property... in which a
person other than the offender has an interest which the offender has no
authority to defeat or impair, even though the offender may also have an
interest in the... property." 9  After quoting the arson statute, the court
concluded that the malicious mischief statute for damage to property "must be
read to impose criminal responsibility on a person who damages another's
interest in property, regardless of whether ownership of the property in
question is shared."'
Similarly, in State v. Webb,' the court upheld a defendant's conviction
for damaging property in an apartment he formerly shared with his estranged
wife. The court looked to the application of the Washington theft statute to
interpret that the property of another language in the malicious mischief statute
includes "property co-owned by the defendant. " 94 The court cited State v.
86. 241 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1987).
87. Id. at 725 (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 724 (quoting CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 490 (14th ed.
1981)).
89. 487 N.E.2d 379 (I1. App. Ct. 1985).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 380 (alterations in original).
92. Id.
93. 824 P.2d 1257 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
94. Id. at 1263.
[Vol. 48:641
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Pike,91 which held that the property of another element of theft "consists of
property in which another person has an interest and over which the 'defendant
may not lawfully exert control... absent the permission of that other per-
son.'" 96 The court found importance in the physical distinction between theft
and destruction. Essentially, the court felt that because destruction forecloses
any possibility of redeeming one's ownership rights sound policy reasons
demanded different interpretations for property of another in the malicious
mischief context and the theft context.'
In State v. Zeien,95 the defendant was convicted of malicious mischief
"for damaging contents in the home of his estranged wife." The court used the
principles of general property law to hold that the malicious mischief statute
applied to marital property damaged by one's spouse." The court noted that
"[u]nder general property law, when married persons own property together
each has 'a separate, distinct and undivided interest in all of the property so
held. ' '""t Applying these principles to the facts, the court stated that the
wording of the malicious mischief statute, "as well as public policies of
preventing domestic violence and damage to property generally, suggests...
that the statute should apply to marital property as well as any other."' 0 '
In an analogous criminal context, men have been charged with burglary
for entering the home or car of their wives."'2 For example, in State v. Peck,
the Iowa Supreme Court upheld a defendant's conviction for burglary because
he entered a home that he had previously shared with his wife and the wife
had obtained a court order restraining the defendant "from coming upon any
premises occupied by the petitioner and minor children ... ."13 Despite the
fact that the house had been the marital home of the parties, the court found,
pursuant to the court order, that the defendant had no "right, license or
privilege" to enter the premises."° Referring to the public policies underly-
ing its decision in Zeien, the court noted that "[a]pplication of our burglary
95. 826 P.2d 152 (Wash. 1992) (en bane).
96. Webb, 824 P.2d at 1262-63 (alterations in original).
97. Id. at 1263.
98. 505 N.W.2d 498 (Iowa 1993).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 498 (quoting In re Estate of Rogers, 473 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Iowa 1991)).
101. Id. at 499. Note that criminal mischief statutes apply unequivocally where the batterer
destroys his girlfriend's or ex-wife's individually owned property. Questions arise only where
mutual ownership interests appear.
102. State v. Peck, 539 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1995); People v. Buckner, 561 N.E.2d 335 (l1.
App. Ct. 1990).
103. Peck, 539 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting court order).
104. Id. at 172-73.
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law in these circumstances will tend to discourage domestic violence and
promote security in the home." 5
In People v. Buckner,"° an Illinois appellate court found a husband
could be convicted of burglarizing his wife's car. The defendant argued that
his conviction for burglary should have been reversed "because the evidence
showed he had driven his wife's car on prior occasions with her permis-
sion."" ° The court, however, held that, although the car may have been
marital property, the defendant could nevertheless be convicted of burglarizing
the car because the defendant only was permitted to drive the car when he had
his wife's permission."'3
It should be noted that in some states, criminal mischief may also be
grounds for a criminal or family court order of protection. Currently nine
states issue civil protection orders based on malicious property damage:
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Tennessee, and Washington.' 9 When a husband destroys a televi-
sion, breaks dishes, or kills the family cat, a woman may fear that she will be
the next target of his destruction. Other states would be prudent to consider
issuing orders of protection on these grounds as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are many advantages to using criminal mischief statutes in domestic
violence situations. Lieutenant Ray Sigwalt, the Domestic Violence Unit Chief
for the San Diego Police Department, has stated that the single biggest
advance in domestic violence intervention in his jurisdiction occurred when
California's vandalism laws were interpreted to apply to a batterer's destruc-
tion of community property."' Application of a criminal mischief statute in
domestic violence situations makes criminal liability more probable by
lessening problems that typically arise when charging a batterer with assault.
For example, the only evidence available to support an assault charge
frequently may be a battered woman's statement, since bruising may not
appear immediately, and often there are no witnesses other than the perpetrator
and the victim. The circumstances are not dramatically improved when
bruises appear days later because such evidence often goes unrecorded and has
healed by the time of trial. However, criminal mischief cases sometimes arise
in the context of wider ranging property destruction by the batterer. In
105. Id. at 173.
106. 561 N.E.2d at 341.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 343.
109. Klein & Orloff, supra note 14, at 873 & n.439.
110. Interview Lieutenant Ray Sigwalt, San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 26, 1996).
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contrast to the assault charge, a valid criminal mischief claim inherently
presents tangible details of destroyed property for police to witness, voucher,
and preserve. Evidence such as ripped phone lines, shards from a broken
mirror, and other markings along a path of material destruction, unlike the
in-court testimonial evidence of battered women, does not become unavailable
at trial because of threats of retaliation.' Interestingly, batterers who would
never admit to striking a spouse readily admit to intentional property damage,
which admissions are a bonus piece of the domestic violence proof-puzzle.
Additionally, it is much easier to establish felonious damage to property
than felonious damage to the person. The crux of the dichotomy is that the
threshold injury required in establishing even misdemeanor assault in many
states is rather high, and that required for felony assault is often quite
high."' On the other hand, to establish felony status for criminal mischief
111. In jurisdictions, such as San Diego, California and Quincy, Massachusetts, that are
dramatically reducing their domestic violence homicide statistics, the approach is to prepare the
case to go forward without the victim. The first step is to presume the victim will not testify. See,
e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. Rv. 1850 (1996); Alison Frankel, Domestic Disaster, AM. LAW.,
June 1996, at 55, 56, 60; Stephanie B. Goldberg, Nobody's Victim, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 48,
50. This presumption is based on studies that show 50% of battered women continue to live with
their abuser. Gwen DeVasto, Quincy, Mass. A.D.A., Address at the Quincy Coordinated
Community Response Team Training Program (Nov. 7, 1996). Battered women know how
dangerous leaving can be. The reality is that divorced and separated women who have left their
mates report being battered 14 times as often as women still living with their partners. NCADV
Voice (Newsletter of the Nat'l Coalition Against Domestic Violence), Spring 1992. A criminal
justice system with goals of victim safety, batterer accountability, and zero tolerance for domestic
violence, should work with its police, its advocates, and its domestic violence task force to create
cases that make victim testimony unnecessary and should avoid "second-guessing" the victim's
choice not to leave.
112. For example, in New York to be guilty of assault in the third degree, which is a misde-
meanor, the defendant must cause "physical injury to another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 120.00(1) (McKinney 1987). For a defendant to be guilty of a felony level assault in the second
degree, the defendant must "cause serious physical injury to another person." N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 120.05(1). The New York Penal Law defines "physical injury" as "impairment of physical
condition or substantial pain," while it defines "serious physical injury" as "physical injury which
creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement,
protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
organ." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(9)-(10). It is unlikely that a defendant would be charged with
a felony level assault for battering his wife, where the wife receives bruises and minor cuts,
because such injuries do not rise to the level of serious physical injuries as defined by New York
law. In fact, New York case law suggests that such injuries may not even rise to the level
required for a misdemeanor level assault. In In re Philip A., 400 N.E.2d 358 (N.Y. 1980), the
New York Court of Appeals asked the question, "When is pain 'substantial' within the meaning
of subdivision 9 of section 10.00 of the Penal Law?" Id. at 359. The court found that "evidence
that complainant was hit, that it caused him pain, the degree of which was not spelled out, caused
him to cry and caused a red mark ... was insufficient to establish 'substantial pain' beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 359.
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in states like New York, a batterer would only have to break a good-sized
television. In sum, gathering sufficient evidence for a domestic violence
prosecution based on a criminal mischief theory can be much easier than
collecting and using evidence of battering behavior based on assault or some
other more common legal theory.
A tangential benefit to interpreting criminal mischief as applicable to the
destruction of community property, particularly in the many states that now
have mandatory arrest for batterers, is that it will be one additional tool that
police officers can use to determine who is the primary aggressor during a
domestic violence altercation. If a television has been hurled at a door and the
wife is 5 feet 2 inches and the husband is 6 feet tall, police discretion and
investigation would likely lead to the conclusion that the husband was the
aggressor, even if both parties exhibit minor injuries. The decision of whom
to arrest and in what context to avoid mutual arrest is clearer when the
criminal mischief misdemeanor and felony statutes are available as charging
options. Moreover, if domestic violence is truly criminal in nature as federal
and state governments now emphasize," 3 and if destruction of a spouse's
property is understood in a given context as a form of control, bullying, and
fear induction-a form of domestic violence-consistency mandates the ability
to charge batterers with the crime of criminal mischief.
Few state appellate courts have interpreted the language of their
respective statutes to determine whether a husband can be charged with
criminal mischief for destroying jointly owned or marital property. Only
appellate courts in California, Illinois, Iowa, and Washington have held that
such charges are viable and based on sound public policy. To their credit, no
appellate court in any reported decision from any state has held otherwise. We
are left with the conclusion that it is merely a matter of training and leadership
momentum to acquaint law enforcement and prosecutors with the availability
of criminal mischief as a valid law enforcement weapon in the war against
domestic violence.
113. Findings preceding the N.Y. Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act
of 1994, 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 222 (uncodified). President Bill Clinton stated, "Violence against
women within our families will not go away unless we all take responsibility for ending it." John
F. Harris, Clinton Makes a Personal Appeal for Men to End Violence Against Women, WAsH.
PosT, Oct. 15, 1995, at AS.
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